I. Ethics

Why Study Ethics?
The Source of Moral Values?
Ethical Relativism

This course deals with the area of philosophical discussion and inquiry known as "ethics" or "moral philosophy." As these terms suggest, the primary focus of this area of inquiry is issues that arise in ethical or moral situations, situations which raise questions concerning what we ought or should do when the issue is not purely a matter of self-interest, but of right and wrong. An ethicist attempts to bring some clarity of thought to these issues: to define clearly the language that is used to discuss them, to reveal the forms of inference that underlie our reasoning about them, and to determine and justify principles that can provide guidance in resolving these issues by bringing into consistency our best thoughts and intuitions on these matters.
Ethics is therefore reflective and critical: it does not attempt simply to codify commonly accepted beliefs concerning moral questions, but attempts to find the grounds for reasonable moral beliefs. Because of this, ethics should be distinguished from what we commonly call "morality," which is simply a set of beliefs accepted by a given culture concerning what a moral agent ought or ought not to do in moral situations, whether these beliefs are a product of critical reflection or not. Although many people do at times consider the cogency of their moral beliefs in a critical manner, the philosophical ethicist attempts to do this in a manner that is broader in scope and more systematic in methodology than is typical in common moral reflection.

Why Study Ethics?

The aim of ethics, it should be noted, is not to give people good character. Research in developmental psychology suggests that factors such as family environment, parental disciplinary styles, peer group reinforcement and others are the basis for the development of what we commonly call "good moral character." The study of ethics can have no more influence on a person's character than the study of mathematics can alter a person's basic quantitative intelligence.
What the study of ethics can do is to provide some understanding of basic ethical principles, and strategies of moral reasoning, that can be used in discussion and debate in support of positions on moral issues. It is not enough simply to have a viewpoint on a moral issue to enter into intelligent discussion on the moral issue, any more than it is enough simply to have a theory in order to do science. The more that is required in science is some evidence to back up the theory. In moral discussion, what is required is a reasonable analysis of the moral situation, and a considered application of moral values and principles that together suggest why the viewpoint should be accepted. Without this rational basis for offering the viewpoint, moral discussion offers nothing better than a dogmatic insistence that a given view is correct--a fruitless endeavor.
In this course, we will be considering some of the elements of good ethical reasoning, and the application of these to some contemporary issues of moral concern. We will not attempt to discover what the "truth" is on any of the particular moral questions we consider. Rather, the aim of the course is to provide an understanding of good moral reasoning that is sufficient to allow the student to enter into ethical discussions in an intelligent and reasonable manner. This endeavor presupposes a certain attitude on the part of the members of the course, an attitude that involves two components: (1) a tolerance for other people's moral viewpoints (again, dogmatic insistence on an ethical position cuts off moral discussion rather than promoting it), and (2) an expectation on the part of one's own contributions to moral debate and discussion as well as those of others that viewpoints should be offered with justifying reasons for those viewpoints.

The Source of Moral Values

Viewpoints concerning the source of moral values have been and continue to be quite diverse. Religious ethics locates this source in an all-good god, who reveals through scriptural writings the rights and wrongs by which we should live, and ultimately judges our lives on the basis of the degree to which we conform to these standards in our conduct. A modern trend in ethical thought, which can be traced back to the writings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, understands moral values as based in the natural order in some fashion. Thus moral rights and duties can be discovered by considering the "natural manner" in which people interact with each other and their physical environment.
    Who's right? Happily we do not have to decide the issue, notwithstanding its importance, since the critical evaluation of moral beliefs that is the aim of ethical inquiry does not require that we determine the source of moral values, but simply that we acknowledge that there are moral values and that a reasonable application of these values requires that they be applied in a consistent manner.
    To understand what a consistent application of moral values is, consider an inconsistent application. The issue is slavery--a moral issue that has long been decided, but one that was the center of active debate in the early nineteenth century in this country. We commonly believe that people should be treated equally, that is, that people should be accorded the same respect in the manner in which we interact with them regardless of who they are, what their background is, and so forth. Slave holders in the early nineteenth century would typically accept this standard with respect to their family and the community around them, but not with respect to their slaves. This suggests an inconsistency in the application of the standard of equality of treatment unless there is some other relevant factor that requires that slaves should not be treated equally. One such factor commonly cited was intelligence: a person of African descent, it was thought, is not as intelligent as someone of European descent, and thus they could not be educated and could not live independent lives. The fact, however, that when given the opportunity slaves did learn as well as their slave holders' children, and that some of them demonstrated their capacity for great intellectual accomplishments, such as the famous author and abolitionist Frederick Douglass, showed that the claim of the slave's alleged intellectual inferiority was false. What we have, then, is an inconsistency of the application of a moral value, that of equality--an inconsistency that is easily discovered if the relevant moral value, equality, is articulated in clear language, and then applied to the manner in which slave holders treated their slaves.
    Ethics, then, does not require that we determine the ultimate source or basis of moral values. It is enough that we admit that we do apply common moral values to our own conduct and the conduct of others, that these moral values can be stated in clear and unambiguous language, and that they can then be applied consistently in different moral situations as guidelines to action, or, as above, can be applied to actual conduct to discern the inconsistencies of their application.

Ethical Relativism

But what if there are no common moral values? What if our moral beliefs are neither right nor wrong, but are simply "opinions" with no more objective validity than such matters of individual preference as whether someone likes butter or sour cream on their potato? The position that makes this claim is commonly known as "ethical relativism." If the ethical relativists are right, then there are no common standards of moral judgment, and the ethicist, who would try to define such standards, is working in vain.
There are a couple of different versions of ethical relativism. One version, individual relativism, claims that moral standards are relative to individual moral beliefs--that in effect what one believes is right is right with respect to one's own actions--and thus no sound moral argument condemning the actions of a moral agent can be offered if the conclusion of the argument is inconsistent with the moral beliefs of the agent. A typical way in which this position is expressed is the following: "everyone has different moral views, and will make different moral judgments under the same circumstances, so there's no point in trying to find a common moral standard because there is none." Another version of ethical relativism is so-called cultural relativism. According to this view, moral standards are relative to cultural moral beliefs. Thus although one can justifiably condemn the actions of a person that are inconsistent with the moral beliefs of that person's culture, no condemnation of the actions of a person of a certain culture can be justified if those actions are consistent with the moral beliefs of that person's culture. Typically this position has been offered to support the claim that we should respect the beliefs and practices of other cultures in order to avoid allowing our own cultural beliefs to be the basis of unfair assessments of these cultures. Thus the position might be expressed in this manner: "various cultures throughout the world have different moral standards, and it is simply a prejudice of our own cultural perspective to find fault with these views."
Although there are a number of good arguments that can be offered against ethical relativisms of either sort, one of the most straightforward ways of suggesting the implausibility of ethical relativism is to note the implications of the view. It is particularly difficult to be a consistent relativist when one is harmed or injured by others. I will offer here two hypothetical situations, one corresponding to each of the versions of ethical relativism, and state the implications of the respective versions in these cases. The extremity of the actions considered in these cases is meant simply to make the difficulty of accepting relativist conclusions clear; similar difficulties would arise in the consideration of less extreme moral offenses. Place yourself in these situations and consider whether you could accept the implications of ethical relativism.

Individual Relativism

The Situation:

The Implications of Relativism: So long as the assailant in this case does not believe he has done anything wrong, he has indeed done nothing wrong. You have no basis to complain about his actions, even if he acted with full knowledge that you and your family objected to his actions, and that society views such actions as grossly immoral. Although you might wish to avenge his actions by harming him, if you do so your actions are no more praiseworthy (or blameworthy) than his. You may appeal to the law, but no court would be justified on a moral basis to convict or imprison the assailant. If this is done, the actions of the court are no more praiseworthy (or blameworthy) than those of the assailant. In fact, a legal system which would condemn the actions of the assailant would be no better on moral grounds than one that allowed such actions, or even one that would reward the assailant for his actions by paying him $3 million from public funds.

Cultural Relativism
The Situation: There is a country, Xenophobia, that contains two distinct cultural groups: the majoritarians and the minoritarians. The majoritarians make up 90% of the population, the minoritarians the remaining 10%. There is a long history of suspicion and hatred in majoritarian culture against the minoritarians. According to majoritarian cultural history, the majoritarians are a culturally superior race that were the original inhabitants of Xenophobia, and they therefore see minoritarians as inferior and usurpers of their native lands. You are a minoritarian. The fragile truce between the majoritarians and minoritarians disintegrates over a murder case in which a minoritarian is charged with the assassination of a prominent majoritarian politician. There is a quick move in the legislature of Xenophobia to round up all minoritarians and place them in internment camps and to suspend judicial procedures in all cases where minoritarians are charged with crimes. The bill is quickly approved, and you and your family are interned. Your brother was charged with a robbery some years ago, and because the repressive law against minoritarians is retroactive, the commander of the camp takes your brother to the firing range where he is executed by firing squad.

The Implications of Relativism: So long as the actions taken by the majoritarians are consistent with their cultural beliefs, there is nothing wrong with their actions. You have no moral basis upon which to complain about their actions, even if the majoritarians understand that world opinion condemns their actions. You and other minoritarians might wish the world community (e.g., the United Nations) to place economic sanctions against the majoritarians, or even intervene militarily, but if it did, these actions against the majoritarians would be no more praiseworthy (or blameworthy) than those of the majoritarians. Alternatively, you and other minoritarians might believe that you are justified in taking up arms against the majoritarians, if you can manage it. But an armed revolt against the majoritarians would not be just or right in any significant moral sense. Morally speaking, such an action would be no more meritorious than the repressive actions of the majoritarians to which you react.

If you find these implications objectionable then you cannot accept ethical relativism.
    Although there are theoretical reasons why some philosophers (a small minority historically) have accepted moral relativism, most people who adopt relativism do so on the basis of reasons that involve unguarded judgment or simple conceptual confusions. As I noted above, some people in the past have adopted cultural relativism as a basis for insisting that people should respect the beliefs and traditions of other cultures, even if they are not consistent with those of one's own culture. But ironically cultural relativism undermines any moral basis upon which one might justify this normative claim. Upon a relativist view, if the people of a given culture believe that it is quite proper to annihilate another culture completely, there is no justification for objection.
    Another common reason that people adopt ethical relativism is the erroneous view that if one rejects relativism, then the only alternative is to accept a position that they find unacceptable, commonly known as moral absolutism: the view that there are a certain set of moral rules that apply in all relevant cases without exception. According to moral absolutism, for example, lying to others is always wrong, even in cases where, for example, not lying would result in great harm to others. But rejecting ethical relativism does not require the acceptance of moral absolutism, but the acceptance of a broader position commonly called moral objectivism or moral realism. This view simply makes the claim that normative judgments can be justified on objective (nonrelativistic) grounds, but a moral objectivist is not necessarily committed to the claim that moral standards are absolute. Common moral standards can be understood to apply in different ways depending on the circumstances of particular moral situations. So a lie might be justified under certain circumstances.
    Sometimes people embrace relativism as a reaction against traditional moral beliefs that they regard as oppressive and odious. It certainly is the case that people in the past, as many people of the present, have held certain moral beliefs that from a more enlightened point of view are clearly objectionable, such as the moral permissibility of slavery, the moral impermissibility of treating women as equals, and the like. But the rejection of ethical relativism does not imply that traditional moral beliefs must be accepted. In fact, the acceptance of traditional beliefs for no better reason than that they are traditional is a fallacy of moral reasoning, and quite antithetical to any reasoned moral position. Furthermore, the claim that traditional moral beliefs are wrong is a normative one, and thus can only be justified from a nonrelativist or objectivist standpoint. So those who embrace relativism as a reaction against moral conventions undercut any grounds upon which they can justify their reaction.
    Another reason some people adopt relativism is from a pessimistic skepticism concerning the possibility of any definitive resolution of moral issues. They hear different views voiced on contemporary issues, all supported by what appear to be convincing arguments, and throw up their hands in frustration, concluding that no truth can be found: "it's all a matter of how you look at it." But this reaction is premature: there is no reason to believe that because there are different and quite reasonable views on important moral issues, and the debates have yet to be resolved, that therefore they are irresolvable. Most important issues in any area of serious discussion--in science, mathematics, political thought--are resolved only after a time, often a lengthy time, of vigorous debate. There is no reason to believe that ethical issues should be any easier to resolve; in fact, the complexity of these issues suggests that they should be quite difficult to resolve in any easy manner. Moral skepticism also loses sight of the fact that historically many moral issues that were hotly debated in the past have been settled in ways that no reasonable person would object to today: that slavery is immoral, that women should have the same legal rights as men, that racism is immoral, that religious freedom should be protected by law, etc. Moral argument played a crucial role in the resolution of these issues. But from the point of view of moral relativism, we would have to conclude that the adoption of these beliefs in fact effected no advance in moral understanding--that if these beliefs had been rejected, our society would be none the worse for it.
    The common reasons, then, offered for adopting ethical relativism are, on close examination, quite unconvincing, and in practice it is quite difficult for any reasonable person to adopt the view consistently. At any rate, in this course we will accept moral objectivism as the basis of our discussions: simply put, that moral positions can be justified on the basis of rationally supportable and objective criteria.

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